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Abstract
Common practice in anomaly-based intrusion detection
is that one size fits all: a single anomaly detector should
detect all anomalies. Compensation for any performance
shortcomings is sometimes effected by resorting to corre-
lation techniques, which could be seen as making use of
detector diversity. Such diversity is intuitively based on
the assumption that detector coverage is different – per-
haps widely different – for different detectors, each cover-
ing some disparate portion of the anomaly space. Diversity,
then, enhances detection coverage by combining the cover-
ages of individual detectors across multiple sub-regions of
the anomaly space, resulting in an overall detection cover-
age that is superior to the coverage of any one detector. No
studies have been done, however, in which measured effects
of diversity in anomaly detectors have been obtained.
This paper explores the effects of using diverse anomaly-
detection algorithms (algorithmic diversity) in intrusion de-
tection. Experimental results indicate that while perfor-
mance/coverage improvements can in fact be effected by
combining diverse detection algorithms, the gains are sur-
prisingly not the result of combining large, non-overlapping
regions of the anomaly space. Rather, the gains are seen at
the edges of the space, and are heavily dependent on the
parameter values of the detectors, as well as on the charac-
teristics of the anomalies.
As a consequence of this study, defenders can be pro-
vided with detailed knowledge of diverse detectors, how
to combine and parameterize them, and under what con-
ditions, to effect diverse detection performance that is supe-
rior to the performance of a single detector.
1 Introduction
There are many problems that plague anomaly-based in-
trusion detectors today, e.g., high false-alarm rates [3], in-
consistency of detector performance [10, 30], training is-
sues, e.g., how often should an anomaly detection system be
retrained to ensure acceptable performance [2], inadvertent
incorporation of intrusive behavior into a detector’s con-
cept of normal behavior possibly causing the intrusion to
be missed by the detector [13], and so forth.
Despite these problems that make an effective anomaly
detector an elusive quantity, anomaly detection continues
to play a significant role in the intrusion detection arsenal.
This is because anomaly detection remains, arguably, the
most promising technique for detecting more insidious, and
potentially more destructive, malicious incidents such as
novel attacks and insider threats – such incidents are diffi-
cult to detect because they typically do not constitute a clear
violation of security protocols, and they often lack clear, re-
liable signatures to facilitate their detection. Over the years,
despite the increasing numbers of new and diverse anomaly
detectors that have appeared in the intrusion detection liter-
ature, there has, unfortunately, not been a concomitant im-
provement in intrusion detection effectiveness.
The effort to address the sluggish progress in the area
of anomaly-based intrusion detection requires a slight shift
in focus from the creation of ever-more, ever-new, anomaly
detection algorithms. Strategies are needed that attempt to
evaluate, understand and harness the strengths of the detec-
tors that are already present in the literature [29, 26, 30].
These efforts have served to highlight the paucity of evalu-
ation methods for establishing the operational effectiveness
of anomaly detectors in a manner that is consistent and re-
peatable. The lack of such evaluation strategies makes it
extremely difficult to assess the effectiveness of anomaly
detectors, compare their relative strengths and weaknesses,
make measurable improvements and – perhaps more inter-
estingly – understand how to select and combine anomaly
detectors effectively to improve detection performance, tak-
ing advantage of their inherent algorithmic diversity.
It is interesting to observe that despite the variety of
anomaly detectors currently present in the intrusion detec-
tion literature, there appears to be an implicit assumption
that a single anomaly detection algorithm is all that is re-
quired to detect intrusions or attacks on any given sys-
tem. This assertion is supported by a further two obser-
vations. First, intrusion detection systems claiming to per-
form anomaly detection typically employ only one kind of
anomaly detection algorithm (e.g., [8, 10, 9, 28]). There is
however, no evidence to suggest that a single anomaly de-
tector will be sufficient for a given intrusion detection task.
This is mainly because there is currently no study showing
that the kinds of anomalies arising as manifestations of at-
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tacks are actually the kinds of anomalies that are detected
by any given detector.
Second, of the studies that compare more than one
anomaly detector (e.g., [30, 11]), the results of their re-
spective efforts have been to determine the “best” sin-
gle anomaly detection strategy for a data set. There are
currently no studies, that the authors are aware of, ac-
knowledging the possibility that effective intrusion detec-
tion may not necessarily be afforded by choosing the sin-
gle, best-performing anomaly detector. Rather, by combin-
ing anomaly detectors such that the strengths of one may
compensate for the limitations of another, one might take
advantage of a natural diversity across a wide variety of de-
tection algorithms.
Littlewood and Strigini [5] note a renewed interest in us-
ing diversity for security, observing that many papers have
invoked “diversity” as an aid for security. However, de-
spite the demonstrated awareness of diversity as a poten-
tially valuable tool, there remains an absence of strategies
by which to choose amongst diverse designs, as well as a
lack of a means of evaluation, once the designs have been
selected. The present work takes inspiration from these ob-
servations, and presents an evaluation strategy for assessing
the effectiveness of various, diverse anomaly detectors from
the intrusion detection literature.
Although it may be expected, intuitively, that diverse de-
tection algorithms perform differently, an identification of
precisely what those performance differences are, whether
those differences can truly be attributed to diversity, and the
acquisition of evidence supporting the potential value of di-
versity as a tool, argue for a more disciplined study into the
effects of diversity on detector performance.
The problem at the core of this study is one of choice.
How can one make an informed choice amongst a set of
anomaly detectors in a way that promotes improved detec-
tor performance? How can detectors be chosen such that
their combined performance would result in a net improve-
ment? The results of the evaluation strategy presented in
this study describe the operational characteristics of a de-
tector and provides a basis upon which to select amongst
diverse detector designs, and knowledge regarding the ef-
fects of combining more than one detector.
This paper makes the following contributions. It clarifies
issues with current approaches to anomaly-based detection
evaluation, and explains their shortcomings. It shows how
diversity affects the performance of a well-known collection
of detectors found in the intrusion-detection literature. It
identifies the capabilities of that set of detectors, and shows
why certain combinations of diverse detectors would not
provide improvements in detection performance. Finally,
it provides a methodology for evaluation whose results will
remain consistent, irrespective of the data or environment
used in testing.
2 Background and related work
Anomaly detection, as a mechanism for detecting com-
puter security violations, was arguably initiated by Jim An-
derson in 1980 [1], and further promulgated by Dorothy
Denning about seven years later [4]. Denning, in particular,
hypothesized that, “... exploitation of a system’s vulnerabil-
ities involves abnormal use of the system; therefore, secu-
rity violations could be detected from abnormal patterns of
system usage.”
Many evaluations of anomaly-based detection systems
have examined the efficacy of various detection algorithms
on various data sets [6, 8, 10, 11, 14, 18, 22, 30]. Unfortu-
nately, they paid little heed to how attacks manifest in data,
nor did they account for distinctions among anomaly types,
treating all anomaly types as being equivalent. Neverthe-
less, the studies made it very clear (especially Warrender at
al. [30]) that different detectors perform differently. How-
ever, the methodologies employed in these evaluations were
perhaps inadvertently directed at intrusion detection, not
anomaly detection; they evaluated the ability to detect and
diagnose attacks simultaneously, combining the two distinct
steps of detection and causal attribution.
To appreciate this distinction it is helpful to review how
most such evaluations are performed, and why. The typi-
cal procedure is: (a) collect sets of normal data, absent of
intrusions or attacks, and a set of test data, containing in-
trusions or attacks; (b) train the intrusion detection system
on the normal data, and then run it against the test data 1; (c)
measure the success of the detection algorithm in terms of
hit, miss, and false alarm rates.
Evaluations are done this way because it seems to be in
keeping with Denning’s hypothesis – namely, that attacks
will manifest as anomalies in monitored data. While Den-
ning’s hypothesis lies at the heart of anomaly-based intru-
sion detection, it may have been taken too literally by many
practitioners who equate detecting anomalies with detecting
attacks. An implicit assumption has been made that links
an attack or intrusion directly with an anomaly. In fact, due
largely to a Denning-centric approach, several concerns are
raised with such an approach, as detailed below. These con-
cerns are addressed in the experimental methodology em-
ployed in the present work, except for attack manifestations
in data and attack manifestations not anomalous. The fo-
cus on establishing the basic anomaly detection capabilities
places these two issues outside the scope of the study.
Operationalizing the definition of “anomaly”. An op-
erational definition identifies the exact manner by which an
event or object is measured. Since different detectors detect
anomalies in different ways, it is important to know how an
anomaly is defined (in some way more precise than simply
1This is equivalent to constructing a statistical model of normal behav-
ior on the basis of the training data, and then examining each test-data
event to see if it is anomalous with respect to that model.
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stating that it is an outlier). Evaluations typically do not in-
clude operational definitions of anomalies, so it is difficult
to determine what exactly is being detected. The work that
is perhaps closest to operationally defining an anomaly is
that of Fan et al. [7] who describe the use of heuristically
defined artificial anomalies as an aid to learners in increas-
ing the separability between classification spaces. Artifi-
cial anomalies in this context are not the target of specific
kinds of anomaly-detection algorithms, and so are outside
the scope of the present work.
Ground-truth assurance. To effect proper scoring,
ground truth (a statement of undisputed fact regarding the
test data) must be known. That is, it must be determined ex-
actly where anomalies have been injected into the test data,
so that when the detector issues a decision, the correctness
of that decision can always be assured. Because most eval-
uations employ natural data, detailed assurance of ground
truth is seldom provided, casting doubt on results.
Generality of sampling in data sets. Natural data, un-
less sampled for a very long time (perhaps infinite) are un-
likely to contain all possible manifestations of anomalies,
or all conditions of attacks. Consequently, the detector can-
not be guaranteed to have been tested against all conditions.
Natural data may not contain all the conditions needed for
complete detector coverage.
Attack manifestations in data. There is a broad and
common assumption that an intrusion or attack will mani-
fest in the monitored data that is being analyzed by the de-
tector. In fact, it may manifest only in data outside the scope
of the detector, or it may not manifest at all [12].
Attack manifestations not anomalous. Not all attacks
manifest as anomalies; many attacks manifest or appear in
monitored data in ways that are not anomalous, and hence
will not be detected as anomalies [12].
Detector capability. The detector under scrutiny may
not be capable of detecting all manner of anomalies (this
harks back to the issue of operational definitions), and in
particular may be unable to detect anomalies caused by the
attacks of interest.
A proper evaluation of an anomaly-based intrusion-
detection system can be derived from Figure 1. Note that
assessing intrusion-detection capabilities requires attending
to all five steps in the diagram, whereas assessing anomaly-
detection capabilities requires only steps D and E (because
the use of synthetic data, not natural data, includes steps A,
B and C by design).
The authors are not aware of any previous work cen-
tered on the anomaly detection capabilities of anomaly de-
tectors, nor of any work focused on assessing the diversity
of anomaly detectors, e.g., combining diverse detectors so
that the strengths of one can compensate for the limitations
of another. The closest may be that of Warrender [30], who
evaluated several detectors in terms of intrusion-detection
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Is the type of anomalous manifestation detectable
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Figure 1: Steps for determining whether or not an attack or
intrusion is detectable by an anomaly-based detector.
capabilities, but did not attempt to combine detectors.
3 Hypothesis and approach
It is often asserted, by implication, that any anomaly de-
tector can be applied to an anomaly detection task, because
all such detectors have the same coverage. If this is true,
then identical detection coverage would be expected from
the algorithmically diverse anomaly detectors evaluated in
this study, and the impact of employing diverse detection
algorithms would be minimal. If differences in detection
coverage are exhibited, then a single anomaly detector may
not be sufficient for a given detection task, hence arguing
for the use of diverse detection algorithms.
The hypothesis is, therefore, that all anomaly detectors
are equally capable of detecting anomalous events that may
arise as manifestations of attacks or intrusions.
The approach taken by this study is centered upon three
details: clearly defined anomalous events, a set of sequence-
based anomaly detectors, and carefully constructed syn-
thetic data.
3.1 Clearly defined anomalies - “anomaly-
centric” evaluation
Two observations motivated the decision to evaluate
detection performance with respect to a clearly defined
anomalous event, instead of using attacks or malicious
faults. First, anomaly detectors do not detect attacks or
faults unless these manifest as detectable anomalies. It only
makes sense, therefore, to evaluate an anomaly detector’s
performance with respect to what it is designed to detect
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(anomalies) and not to what it may indirectly detect (at-
tacks).
Second, the way in which an anomaly detector defines
anomalies may not necessarily coincide with the way in
which anomalies naturally occur in data, or the anomalous
ways in which attacks manifest. Two factors affect the
performance characteristics of an anomaly detector: how
the anomaly detector itself perceives anomalies and how
anomalies naturally exist in the data. For example, an
anomaly detector may be designed to detect foreign se-
quences, i.e., sequences that do not exist in the training
data; however, in natural data, foreign sequences may ex-
hibit unforeseen characteristics that may interfere with the
detector’s abilities. This was observed in the results, and is
discussed further in Section 6.
By providing a clear characterization and definition of
the anomalous event that an anomaly detector is expected to
detect, and then assessing whether or not the anomaly detec-
tor is capable of detecting that anomaly under varying con-
ditions, it becomes possible to determine unambiguously
whether detection capabilities are consistent with expecta-
tion, identify any detection weakness, blindness or faults
with respect to the anomalous event, and provide a clear
link between detector performance and anomaly character-
istics.
One may question whether the anomaly used in this
study, the minimal-foreign sequence described in Section
4.1, is of any significance in the real world; i.e., does
this type of anomaly actually occur in natural data? The
answer is yes; natural data has been found to be replete
with minimal-foreign sequences of varying lengths. This
is documented in [26] where data collected from various
computer systems were analyzed; numerous instances of
the minimal-foreign sequence were found in the intrusive
traces.
3.2 Why sequence-based anomaly detectors?
The set of sequence-based detectors comprises the ele-
ment of diversity that is the basis of this study. The chosen
detection algorithms can be described as “diverse”, or dif-
ferent, in that they were designed, created and deployed by
different researchers for different projects, and in the meth-
ods they use to effect anomaly detection.
The primary consideration guiding the choice of detec-
tors was one of experimental control. Anomaly detectors
may be diverse in a number of ways. Detectors may, for ex-
ample, vary in the way they consume data - fixed-length se-
quences, single events, variable length sequences, etc.; de-
tectors may also vary in the way by which they determine an
event to be anomalous, or by the way in which normal be-
havior is modeled, and so forth. Choosing a set of anomaly
detectors that are diverse in several dimensions would make
it difficult to isolate the specific kind of diversity effecting
improved detection performance or detection failure, or to
attribute observed detection performance to the effects of
diversity as opposed to other effects.
For this reason, the substance of diversity in this study is
constrained to only one, and arguably the most important,
aspect of the chosen anomaly detectors - the methods by
which deviations from normal behavior are measured.
The anomaly detectors selected for this study can be de-
scribed as consisting of three general components, namely
1. a mechanism for modeling normal behavior;
2. a metric or method for measuring deviations from the
model of normal behavior; and
3. a thresholding mechanism for determining whether the
detected deviation is significant enough to label the
event as anomalous with respect to normal behavior.
Although the detectors are diverse in the second of these
components, they are invariant in the other two. The basic
event being analyzed is the same for all four detectors - the
fixed-length sequence. All four detectors are expected to
detect the same anomaly (a foreign sequence). The thresh-
olding mechanisms for all four detectors are set by the user,
and are controlled by ensuring that the definitions of hits
and misses are consistent across all four detectors. This is-
sue will be addressed further in Section 4.4, “Scoring per-
formance”.
3.3 Use of synthetic data
Natural data was not used in this study because it was
necessary to ensure that the data upon which the detectors
were to be deployed did not contain confounding elements
that might undermine the fidelity of the final results. To this
end, this study employed synthetic data because it provided
the control necessary for constructing the defined anoma-
lous event, for constructing training and background test
data that were free of spurious, naturally occurring anoma-
lies, and for devising an injection procedure that keeps the
character of the anomalous event and the background data
intact.
4 Experimental methodology
The effect of diversity on detector performance is exam-
ined by focusing narrowly on the abilities of a set of chosen
anomaly detectors to detect a single, clearly defined, and
unequivocally anomalous event. The following list provides
an overview of the experimental methodology designed to
support this intent and the subsequent sections describe the
experiment in detail, giving the rationales and motivations
behind the decisions made for each stage of the experiment
listed below.
• Define the anomaly.
• Select the detectors.
• Synthesize training (normal) data.
• Synthesize the test data.
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– Synthesize the background data.
– Synthesize the anomaly and inject the anomaly
into the background data to create the final cor-
pus of test data.
• Deploy the anomaly detectors on the synthesized train-
ing data and the test data.
• Collect the results.
4.1 The anomaly
The anomalous event used in this study is referred to as
a minimal-foreign sequence2. A foreign sequence can be
described as a sequence of length N where each individual
element within the sequence is a member of the training-set
alphabet, but where the entire length-N sequence itself does
not occur in the training data. A minimal-foreign sequence
is a foreign sequence with the property that all of its proper
sub-sequences do exist in the normal data [26, 21]. Put sim-
ply, a minimal-foreign sequence is a foreign sequence that
contains within it no smaller foreign sequences.
Three reasons prompted the decision to employ only
one anomaly type in this experiment. First, for anomaly
detectors that employ fixed-length sequences, the foreign
sequence is arguably one of the most unambiguously-
anomalous events that can be defined. It is exemplary of the
kind of anomaly that should be detectable by all sequence-
based anomaly detectors unlike rare sequences, for exam-
ple, which are detectable by some detectors (e.g., Markov-
based detectors, Section 4.1.1), and not at all by others (e.g.,
Stide and the Lane and Brodley detector, Section 4.1.1). In
any case, the intrusion detection literature remains ambigu-
ous about the “alarm-worthiness” or “anomalous-ness” of
rare sequences [30].
Second, the use of a single anomaly type was an effort
in experimental control aimed at removing ambiguities that
may arise should a detector’s performance be attributable to
more than one type of detectable phenomenon.
Finally, the use of a single anomaly type would more
clearly illustrate the point that if there are wide variations
in detection capabilities over a single, detectable anomaly,
then the common practice of deploying only one anomaly
detection strategy in a given intrusion detection system may
be prone to failure, arguing for the use of diverse detection
strategies.
4.1.1 The sequence-based anomaly detectors
Four sequence-based anomaly detectors were examined in
this study. The reason for selecting sequence-based detec-
tors is given in Section 3, a reason based primarily on the
desire to constrain diversity to one aspect of the detector,
2Because the minimal-foreign sequence (MFS) is the only anomaly type
used in this study, the term is used interchangeably with the term foreign
sequence for simplicity and readability.
which is in the case of the selected sequence-based detec-
tors, the similarity metric. All of the selected detectors con-
form to the generic description of an anomaly detector in-
troduced in Section 3. They are similar in that they analyze
fixed-length sequences of categorical data. Their diversity
however, lies in the manner in which they each determine
the extent of abnormality of a given sequence, i.e., their
similarity metric. Where one algorithm may employ prob-
abilistic concepts to determine such abnormality, another
would establish abnormality merely as a difference in the
ordering of elements within a sequence.
Given that the model of normal behavior is acquired by
sliding a fixed-length window of size DW across the train-
ing data, and then storing the DW -sized sequences in a
database, the following are the descriptions of the similarity
metrics for each of the four anomaly detectors examined in
this study. In the interest of space conservation, only the
similarity metric for each detector is described. A full and
formal description of all the other aspects of each detector
can be found in the citations provided.
The Stide detector. For every fixed-length sequence of
size DW obtained from the test data, the similarity met-
ric for Stide [8, 30] performs a “look-up” operation that
establishes whether or not that fixed-length sequence from
the test data exists in the normal database. A size-DW se-
quence from the test data that is found to exist in the normal
database is assigned the value 0. A sequence that does not
exist in the normal database is assigned the value 1. No di-
rect probabilistic concepts, such as calculations of frequen-
cies or conditional probabilities, are employed by this algo-
rithm.
The Markov-based detector. For every fixed-length se-
quence of size DW and the following DW + 1st element
obtained from the test data, the Markov-based anomaly de-
tector [14, 28] similarity measure involves a “look-up” op-
eration that determines the probability that the DW + 1st
element in the test data follows the previous size-DW se-
quence. This detector employs conditional probabilities and
produces a score for each element in the test data stream be-
ginning at the DW +1st element. Each element is assigned
a value between 0 and 1, indicating the probability that that
element followed the previous size-DW sequence, where
1 indicates anomalous (highly improbable) and 0 indicates
normal (very probable).
The Neural-network-based detector. For every fixed-
length sequence of size DW obtained from the test data,
the Neural-network-based anomaly detector [6] predicts the
DW+1st element from the test data. This detector employs
the multi-layer, feed-forward learning algorithm to perform
its detection tasks. Although it does not use explicit proba-
bilistic concepts, the detector’s learning algorithm is an ap-
proximation function that can be described as “mimicking”
the effects of employing probabilistic concepts such as con-
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ditional probabilities.
The Lane and Brodley (L&B) detector. For every
fixed-length sequence of size DW obtained from the test
data, the L&B detector [18, 16] performs a similarity calcu-
lation between that sequence and each of the sequences of
the normal database. The similarity metric produces a value
between 0 andDW (DW+1)/2, where 0 denotes the great-
est degree of dissimilarity between the two sequences (i.e.,
the test sequence and a sequence from the normal database),
and DW (DW + 1)/2 denotes the greatest degree of simi-
larity.
Since the L&B detector produced the most conspicuous
performance results (see 5), the similarity metric for this
detector is described more formally to promote a clear un-
derstanding of its behavior that will be discussed in Section
6.
For length DW , the similarity between two given
sequences, X = (x0, x1, ..., xDW−1) and Y =
(y0, y1, ..., yDW−1) is defined by the pair of functions:
w(X,Y, i) =
{
0 if i < 0, or xi = yi
1 + w(X,Y, i− 1) if xi = yi
where w(X,Y, i) = 0 for i < 0, so that w(X,Y, 0) is
well defined when x0 = y0, and
Sim(X,Y ) =
DW−1∑
i=0
w(X,Y, i)
This metric yields a higher score for more similar se-
quences, bounded between 0 and DW (DW + 1)/2, where
DW is the sequence length. The metric is biased toward ad-
jacent elements, i.e., the more matching adjacent elements
between two sequences, the higher the score. If no match
is found for every pair of elements along the two sequences
being compared, a value of 0 is produced by the similarity
metric to indicate the greatest degree of dissimilarity be-
tween the two sequences. No probabilistic concepts such as
calculations of frequencies or conditional probabilities are
used by this detector.
4.2 The training data
Four kinds of data were generated for this experiment:
the training data (data used to establish the normal con-
text); the background test data (data without the anomalous
event); test data (data with the embedded anomalous event);
and the anomalous events themselves.
The training data were constructed using a Markov-
model transition matrix. The precise method for generat-
ing the data (e.g., how the transition matrix was entered,
random number generator used, stc.) is documented in [20]
and [26]. This section will describe the characteristics of the
training data that are pertinent to the present experiments.
The alphabet size for the training data was 8. Although
the alphabet sizes in real-world data are higher than this,
and the alphabet size may play a role with respect to certain
aspects of the data (e.g., influencing the size of the set of
possible sequences that populate the normal database), the
alphabet size of the training data does not affect the synthe-
sis of foreign sequences, nor does it affect a sequence-based
detector’s ability to detect foreign sequences.
The aforementioned matrix was used to generate a
training-data stream of 1,000,000 elements. Three param-
eters were chosen arbitrarily in this experiment: the sam-
ple size of 1,000,000 elements; the length of the minimal-
foreign sequences (AS), which ranged from 2 to 9; and the
definition of a rare sequence - a rare sequence is one with a
relative frequency of less than 0.5% in the training data.
A large proportion of the training data, ninety-eight per-
cent of the one-million-element data stream, consisted of a
repetition of the sequence 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8. This char-
acteristic of the data provided a consistent set of common
sequences that were independent of sequence length, and
that can be used to populate the background data, i.e., the
test data without the injected anomaly. Such background
data, composed of commonly-occurring sequences, is de-
sirable in order to eliminate the possibility that a detector’s
response to an injected anomaly is confounded by naturally-
occurring rare or foreign sequences.
The remaining portion of the training data contained rare
sequences that were the result of a small amount of unpre-
dictability in the probabilities of the data generation matrix.
These rare sequences were necessary for synthesizing the
minimal-foreign sequence anomaly composed of rare sub-
sequences.
4.3 The test data
The test data were constructed in two stages, as described
in the sections below. First the background data set was
created; then the anomalies were synthesized and injected
into the background data to form the final corpus of test
data.
4.3.1 The background data
The background data was composed of the most commonly
occurring sequences only – a repetition of the numbers 1, 2,
3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8. This was done in an effort to ensure that the
background data set was “clean” in that it did not contain
any spurious, naturally occurring foreign or rare sequences
that might confound the results of the experiment.
Such background content means that any detector-
window size, ranging from 1 to the data sample size of a
million, sliding over the background data would only ex-
perience common sequences already present in the training
data. However, this also means that the anomaly-injection
process had to be accomplished very carefully in order to
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keep intact both the composition of the anomaly and the
background data as described. The injection process must
not introduce spurious foreign or rare sequences, particu-
larly in the background data surrounding the anomaly.
4.3.2 Creating and injecting the anomalies
After constructing the training data of 1,000,000 categorical
elements, the training data were used to create the anoma-
lies. The anomalies were minimal-foreign sequences of
sizes 2 to 9, composed of rare sub-sequences. A rare se-
quence is simply defined to be a sequence with a relative
frequency of 0.5% in the training data, a definition taken
from previous work [30].
The decision to use rare sub-sequences to compose the
minimal-foreign sequences was prompted by the expecta-
tion that both the Neural Network detector and the Markov
detector should be able to respond to rare sequences. Al-
though it is known that some detectors in the set, such as
Stide, do not have the ability to respond to rare sequences,
they are nevertheless applied to anomalies with these char-
acteristics primarily to facilitate performance comparisons;
i.e., all the detectors in question will be evaluated on their
ability to detect the same anomaly. Furthermore, it would
be a point of interest to observe, and possibly quantify, how
much more the ability to detect rare sequences actually con-
fers upon the detection of foreign sequences so composed.
It was observed that sequences composed by concatenat-
ing short, rare sequences from the training trace are likely to
be foreign, simply due to the improbability that a substantial
number of rare sequences would appear in the training trace
in the chosen order. It is easy to generate such sequences,
and to verify their foreignness and minimality. These same
properties however, complicate the process of injecting the
anomaly, which unfortunately remains somewhat of a brute
force effort.
The sub-sequences within the composed anomaly tended
to interact with the background data to produce spurious
rare and/or foreign sequences – in short, unintended anoma-
lies. Such sequences were most likely to occur at the bound-
aries where some elements of the injected anomaly and
some elements of the background data combine within the
sliding detector window produce these unintended foreign
or rare sequences. Figure 2 provides examples of these
“boundary sequences.” Randomly injecting an anomaly
into the background data is undesirable, because of the high
probability that a mixture of foreign or rare boundary se-
quences is introduced by such an injection strategy.
Given a detector window of size DW , and a minimal-
foreign sequence anomaly, a desirable injection procedure
is essentially one ensuring that all of the 2(DW − 1) se-
quences of length DW that can be composed at the bound-
ary of the injection (i.e., sequences that contain some ele-
ments of the anomaly and some elements of the background
data) are common sequences that exist in the training data.
No background data sequences or boundary sequences must
register as foreign or rare. If this is not the case for some
location in the trace, a new anomaly must be produced and
the process repeated.
The final suite of evaluation data contains one stream of
training data and 8 streams of test data, where each test-data
stream contains a single minimal-foreign sequence whose
length is selected from the range 2 to 9. This set of 9 data
streams is then repeated for each detector-window length of
2 to 15. Note that the length of the detector window dictates
the length of the sub-sequences that compose each minimal-
foreign sequence. In total there are 112 test data streams.
F F F F F F F F++ + + +++ +Data stream
+ + + F F F F F F +
Boundary SequenceBoundary Sequence
Incident Span
Figure 2: Boundary sequences. Given a foreign sequence
of size 8, where “F” marks the elements of the injected
anomaly and “+” marks the elements of the background
data that are involved in the boundary sequences, two exam-
ples of boundary sequences for a detector window of 5 are
shown. Boundary sequences, sequences that contain some
elements of the background data, are carefully controlled to
eliminate the occurrence of spurious anomalous sequences
that are not the injected anomaly itself. Boundary sequences
are all common sequences, i.e., sequences that occur in the
training data.
4.4 Detector deployment and scoring
The detectors were deployed on the suite of data de-
scribed in the preceding sections. For each minimal-foreign
sequence being detected, the length of the detector win-
dow was varied from 2 to 15. Since no amount of post-
processing can compensate for an underlying inability to
detect a specific anomalous phenomenon, processes that oc-
cur after the similarity measure has been applied, were ig-
nored. This includes the locality frame count (LFC) for
Stide, and various smoothing techniques for the Lane and
Brodley detector.
The results of the experiments are expressed in terms of
hits and misses, and in terms of regions of detection blind-
ness and weakness. When a detector window slides over an
anomaly and encounters a boundary sequence, the interac-
tion between the elements of the injected anomaly sequence
and the background data will prompt the anomaly detector
to respond in one fashion or another. Regardless of how
the detector responds, the response is still influenced by el-
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ements of the injected anomaly. As a consequence, the re-
sponse of the detector in such a circumstance should also
be considered in the process of determining hits or misses.
This line of reasoning resulted in the concept of the inci-
dent span [26] that was used to determine hits and misses
(see Figure 2).
Using the situation in which only a single anomaly was
introduced into each test stream, and letting the detector re-
sponse range from 0 (indicating completely normal) to 1
(indicating maximal abnormality), a detector is described
as
• blind, in the case where the detector response is 0 for
every sequence of the incident span;
• weak, in the case where the maximum detector re-
sponse registered in the incident span is greater than
0 and less than 1, indicating that something that is not
definitely normal has been seen;
• capable, in the case where at least one detector re-
sponse of 1 was registered in the incident span.
Binary detectors, such as the sequence-matching portion
of Stide, are only capable of generating responses of 0 or
1; however, the Neural Network and the Markov-based de-
tector can generate weak responses. Weak responses can
be converted to binary responses by applying a threshold
that converts responses below the threshold to 0 ,and others
to 1. However, to avoid the compounding effects of vary-
ing the threshold for these detectors, the detection threshold
was set to 1 for all detectors, recognizing only maximally
anomalous (foreign) sequences as “hits.”3
5 Results
The results from the experiment presented above are dis-
played in four graphs. Figure 3 presents the detection ca-
pability of the Lane & Brodley detector, Figure 4 shows
the results for the Markov-based detector, Figure 5 shows
the results for Stide; and Figure 6 shows the results for the
Neural-Network-based detector.
The x-axis in these figures marks the increasing length
of the minimal-foreign sequence injected into the test-data
stream; the y-axis charts the length of the detector window
required to detect a minimal-foreign sequence of a given
length. Each star in the field marks the length of the detector
window required to detect a foreign sequence whose corre-
sponding length is marked on the x-axis. The term “detect”
specifically means that a maximum anomalous response oc-
curred in the incident span. The areas that are absent of a
3Detection thresholds are often used to determine “alarm-worthy”
events. The most-anomalous detector response will always register as an
alarm, regardless of where the detection threshold is set. An anomalous
phenomenon generating such a response will never “disappear” or become
a miss when the detection threshold is raised or lowered.
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Figure 3: Detection coverage for the Lane & Brodley detec-
tor
star indicate that the detector was unable to detect the for-
eign sequence whose corresponding length is marked on the
x-axis. Unable-to-detect means that the maximum anoma-
lous response recorded along the entire incident span was 0,
signifying completely normal.
Since the Markov-based detector utilizes the Markov as-
sumption, i.e., that the next state is dependent only upon the
current state, the smallest window length possible is 2. This
means that the next expected, single, categorical element is
dependent only on the current, single, categorical element.
As a result, the y-axis marking the detector-window lengths
in Figure 4 begins at 2. The same argument pertains to the
Neural-Network-based detector in the sense that this detec-
tor predicts the next categorical element based on the cur-
rent categorical element; this makes 2 the smallest workable
detector window length. Although it is technically possible
to run Stide and the Lane & Brodley detector using a detec-
tor window of length 1, doing so would produce results that
do not include the sequential ordering of events, a property
that comes into play with all the detector-window lengths
that are larger than 1. This, together with the fact that there
is no equivalent on the side of the Neural-Network-based
detector and the Markov-based detector, argued against run-
ning Stide and the Lane & Brodley detector with a window
of 1.
The x-axis also begins at 2. This is because the type of
anomalous event upon which the detectors are being eval-
uated requires that a foreign sequence be composed of rare
sequences. A foreign sequence of length 1, therefore, will
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Figure 4: Detection coverage for the Markov-based detector
contain a single element that must be both foreign and rare
at the same time, and this is not possible. As a conse-
quence, all the graphed results show an undefined region
corresponding to the detector-window and anomaly length
of 1.
6 Discussion
The results show that despite the fact that all the detec-
tors examined analyze data an in terms of sliding windows
of fixed-length sequences, and are all expected to be able to
detect foreign sequences, their differing similarity measures
significantly affected their detection capabilities. There are
several points to note from the results, primarily operational
details that must be considered when deploying these detec-
tors.
First, there are regions of detection blindness. Even
for an event as unequivocally anomalous as a foreign se-
quence, some sequence-based detectors are unable to de-
tect its presence. The Lane & Brodley detector, for exam-
ple, will classify a foreign sequence as a sequence close to
normal, while Stide displays a distinct region of blindness
when DetectorWindow ≤ AnomalySize.
Second, the results show that the different similarity
measures used by the various detectors significantly affects
detection performance. In Stide’s case, even though it is
known that there is a foreign sequence present in the data
stream, this foreign sequence is only visible if the length
of the detector window is at least as large as the length
of the foreign sequence. The similarity measure employed
by Stide appears to have a weakness in that it is unable
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Figure 5: Detection coverage for Stide
to detect minimal-foreign sequences composed of rare sub-
sequences under conditions where DW < AS. As a result,
there are no guarantees that Stide will detect attacks or in-
trusions, even if they do manifest as foreign sequences in
the data. The Markov detector, on the other hand, appears
to have no such weakness. The foreign sequence in the data
stream is visible to the Markov-based detector, even when
the length of the detector window is smaller than the length
of the foreign sequence. This can be attributed to the use
of rare sequences to compose the foreign sequence. Un-
der such a circumstance the use of conditional probabilities
appears to have afforded the Markov-based detector an ad-
vantage.
Third, the results provide some insight on how to com-
bine detectors to affect detection performance. Take, for
example, the observation that Stide will only detect foreign
sequences, while the Markov-based detector will detect for-
eign sequences in addition to several variations of rare se-
quences. It follows that should the Markov-based detector
be deployed for intrusion detection purposes, it can only be
expected to produce greater numbers of false alarms than
Stide. This is because it will detect anything that manifests
in the data stream as a foreign symbol (this can be seen as
a foreign sequence of size 1), and various compositions of
foreign and rare sequences. Stide, on the other hand, will
only detect foreign sequences. A circumstance under which
this knowledge may be useful would be when it is known
that an attack typically manifests as a minimal-foreign se-
quence, but the size of this foreign sequence is unknown
(making Stide unreliable as the main detector, since Stide
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Figure 6: Detection coverage for the Neural-Network-based
detector
would only detect such a manifestation if its detector win-
dow is set to at least the known size of the minimal-foreign
sequence). The Markov-based detector can be used to de-
tect the manifestation of the attack itself, while Stide can
be used as a suppressive mechanism to reduce false alarms.
Any alarms raised by the Markov-based detector, but not
raised by Stide, may be ignored as a false alarms; alarms
raised by both Stide and the Markov-based detector are pos-
sible hits. There will be no alarms that would be raised by
Stide and not by the Markov-based detector, since it is now
known from the results of the evaluation that Stide’s detec-
tion coverage is a subset of the Markov-based detector’s.
The combination of Stide and the Markov-based detec-
tor may produce performance improvements in the form of
reduced false alarms, but the combination of Stide and the
Lane & Brodley detector is not as successful. Although both
of these detectors use very different mechanisms with which
to determine an anomaly, they both show blindness in the
same region of the performance chart. In this case, employ-
ing the two detectors to take advantage of the diverse detec-
tion algorithms affords no improvement in performance.
The Neural-network-based detector, although using a
different mechanism by which to affect detection, appears
to be as good as the Markov-based detector. The only caveat
with this detector lies in the reliability of detection. It is
common knowledge that the performance of a multi-layered
feed-forward neural net relies on a balance of parameter val-
ues; e.g., the learning constant, the number of hidden nodes,
and the momentum constant. Some combinations of values
may result in weakened anomaly signals. In these cases,
the setting of another parameter - the detection threshold -
becomes critical in order to detect a particular event.
Finally, by charting the performance of the detectors
with respect to the detection of minimal-foreign sequences,
it was possible to observe the nature of the gain achieved in
detection performance between an algorithm that employs
conditional probabilities and one that employs, for example,
only sequence-matching schemes. This gain in detection
ability is significant, and is illustrated by the blind regions
marked out in Figures 5 and 3.
The most prominent detail in these results is the inabil-
ity of the L&B detector to detect a minimal-foreign se-
quence anomaly even when the entire foreign sequence can
be “seen” by the detector, i.e., DW = AS. The blind-
ness in the L&B detector can be attributed to the similarity
metric that the detector employs. The similarity metric for
the L&B detector is biased in favor of matching adjacent
elements. It is possible for a foreign sequence to match ev-
ery element of a normal sequence except one. If the single,
mismatching element is located at the very first or very last
position of the foreign sequence, the detector returns a sim-
ilarity value indicating that the foreign sequence is close to
normal.
To more clearly illustrate the point, Figure 7 depicts the
similarity calculation between two identical sequences of
size 8. The similarity value for these two identical se-
quences is Simmax =
∑DW
i=1 i =
2
DW (DW+1) = 36. This
is the highest value that the similarity metric can produce
for a detector window of size 8. However, in Figure 8, the
only difference between the a normal sequence and a for-
eign sequence of size 8 is the last element. The similarity
value for these two sequences is Simweak =
∑DW
i=1 i =
2
DW (DW−1) = 28. The slight dip in the similarity value
from 30 to 28 is all that indicates the presence of the for-
eign sequence. Therefore, to detect the foreign-sequence
anomaly, the detection threshold must be set at the next
most normal value, which in this case is 28, so that all simi-
larity values less than or equal to 28 are considered anoma-
lous. This may, however, cause a rise in the false alarm rate.
7 Conclusion
The hypothesis addressed by this study is that all
anomaly detectors are equally capable at detecting anoma-
lies. The hypothesis was rejected; the anomaly detec-
tors evaluated were not equally capable of detecting an
anomaly that should have been detected by all of the de-
tectors. Detection performances differed visibly amongst
detectors diverse only in their similarity metrics. Two detec-
tors can be described as consistent in their detection capa-
bilities (Markov and neural network); one suffered distinct
regions of blindness (Stide); another was unable to detect
the anomaly at all (Lane & Brodley).
10 Tan & Maxion
Performance Evaluation of Anomaly-Based Detection Mechanisms
<2>
<2>
less
less
<2>
<2>
tar
tar
−laF
−laF
ls
ls
<1>
<1>
Normal cd
cdSeq 2
Seq 1
Final Similarity Score: 36
Normal
Figure 7: Similarity calculation between two identical size-
8 sequences. The step curve represents the weight con-
tributed by each match.
There were also differences in the conditions under
which the anomalous event became detectable. These dif-
ferences can be attributed to the differing detection methods
employed by the detectors. For example, due to the nature
of the detectors’ respective similarity metrics, a minimal-
foreign sequence anomaly of size AS was detectable to
Stide when the its window DW was at least equal to AS;
but the same anomaly was invisible to the L&B detector un-
der the same conditions. Since real-world data contain nu-
merous instances of the type of anomaly that was examined
in this study, the results can be expected to affect subsequent
intrusion detection performance.
The operational characteristics uncovered for each of the
detectors exposed and explained serious flaws in some de-
tectors that would undermine their intrusion detection ca-
pabilities, e.g., the L&B detector. The operational charac-
teristics also provided the rationale for why some combina-
tions of detectors (e.g., Stide and the Markov-based detec-
tor) would improve detection performance and why others
(e.g., Stide and the Lane & Brodley) would not.
The results of the study are based on the native abili-
ties of a detector to detect anomalies, and are therefore not
constrained to the synthetic data set used in the experiment.
Regardless of other environments or data sets, the results
of this experiment will remain immutable in that, e.g., if an
attack manifests as a minimal-foreign sequence, Stide will
be unable to detect the phenomenon when the size of its
detector window parameter is smaller than the size of the
anomaly.
Although establishing the operational effectiveness of
the anomaly detection component of any anomaly-based
system is a critical first step in understanding detection per-
formance, to effect progress in intrusion detection, future
work must focus on the relationship between detectable
<2>
<2>
tar
tar
−laF
−laF
ls
ls
<1>
<1> lessSeq 2
Seq 1 cd
cd
<2>
cd
Final Similarity Score: 28
Foreign
Normal less
Figure 8: Similarity calculation between a size-8 sequences
and a foreign sequence that differ only in the last element
results in a value close to normal. The step curve represents
the weight contributed by each match.
anomalies and intrusive behaviors. Specifically, to what ex-
tent can a link between detectable anomalies and intrusive
behaviors be established? How stable are the anomalous
manifestations of attacks? If countermeasure mechanisms
are to be deployed in response to detection results, it is crit-
ical to establish that the anomalies detected were caused by
attacks and not by more innocuous events. This is not a
trivial task.
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